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Critique of IS-LM: fiscal deficits, loanable funds,
Keynesian Cross and IS-LM
Minseong Kim
Abstract. This paper intends to discuss some problematic aspects that IS-LM have
when dealing with fiscal deficits, especially when considering loanable funds model. Many
others have focused on its assumptions for criticism of IS-LM, but I will mainly focus on
its fundamental modelling nature. To say more specifically, I will argue that ordinary IS-
LM analysis is in contradictory nature to simultaneous equilibrium system, and therefore
loanable funds. I will stick completely with IS-LM language for this paper. Therefore, any
opinion expressed about economy in this paper stems from either IS-LM or correction of
IS-LM analysis, not from my academic and personal stance toward economy.
1. Short-run and long-run
It seems that there are two variants related to loanable funds model. First
is that while money market determines short-run interest rate(s), loanable
funds market determines long-run interest rate(s). Second is that money
market determines nominal interest rate, while loanable fund market de-
termines real interest rate, though sometimes money market is also seen
as determine real interest rate together with loanable fund market. In this
paper, I will discuss mainly the second interpretation.
2. The General Theory and the birth of IS-LM
In Chapter 14 of The General Theory of Employment[1], Interest and Money
by John Maynard Keynes, it is argued that loanable funds model cannot
only determine the rate of interest, because saving curve is dependent on
total income economic agents receive. So suppose that government spends
to stimulate economy. Then loanable funds model would say that the rate
of interest increases due to fiscal deficit in short-run. However, this is only
because total income Y is considered as constant, which is not going to be
true.
It is in this spirit that IS-LM was born. It is not really important here
whether Keynes had a real influence on the originators, like Harrod and
Hicks, of IS-LM, so I will not discuss this matter.
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While it is true that IS-LM is now considered by many, including the author,
to be an obsolete model, it nevertheless appears in many policy debates and
textbooks. Therefore, the author believes that it is worth considering the
nature of IS-LM. Economics always strives to find a simple and elegant
explanation that may work given that certain conditions are met.
3. loanable funds, IS-LM and fiscal deficits I
In this section, fiscal deficits will be mainly discussed.
In IS-LM, IS and LM curve map each different baseline rate of interest r with
each different output Y . When government deficit-spends, IS curve moves
to right, which generates higher r and Y , except when economy faces flat
LM curve - often called liquidity trap, though terminology would not be so
correct. In such trap scenario, government deficit-spending will not induce
higher r, and government in time of recession and such trap can exploit this
to reach full employment. The definition of full employment is different from
a person to person - but I will ignore this issue, as this is not the intended
discussion area of this paper.
IS curve is often derived using Keynesian cross or using loanable funds
model. In the former, increased planned investment due to lower interest
rate shifts planned expenditure curve upward, and as Y = PE in Keynesian
cross equilibrium, increased output results. In the latter, desire to save is
greater than desire to invest when Y increases, generating IS-LM. While
Keynes does not seem to express rejection or endorsement of this type of
IS-LM, a such interpretation is indeed in the diagram of Chapter 14. It is ar-
guable (and questionable, in several countries and individual cases) whether
desire to save becomes greater than desire to invest when Y increases, but
the paper will simply assume that this is true.
Let me for now resurrect the discussion of flat LM curve. It is said that when
an equilibrium faces flat LM curve, (r in vertical-axis and Y is horizontal-
axis) it is possible to stimulate an economy by deficit stimulus spending
without increasing r. Is this sustainable in normal loanable funds model? For
this, it might be much preferable just to refer to introductory/intermediate
macroeconomics textbooks available. I will choose N. Gregory Mankiw’s
Principles of Macroeconomics 6th edition[2] and Macroeconomics 7th edi-
tion[3] as reference.
In page 274 of the 9th edition of Principles of Macroeconomics, N. Gregory
Mankiw states that when deficit spending is carried out, national savings
decrease - meaning saving curve in loanable funds moves left. The conclusion
is that r in short-run increases and quantity of loanable funds Q decreases.
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Additionally, it is stated: “Because investment is important for long-run
economic growth, government budget deficits reduce the economy’s growth
rate.”
To be a bit off of the paper’s main arguments, the conclusion reached by
Mankiw seems to be highly misleading. It is not clear what Mankiw actu-
ally intended. First of all, if Mankiw intended that even after fiscal spending
is carried out in one single-time saving curve will remain shifted to left
because national savings decreased due to G− T (G: government spend-
ing, T : government revenues, including taxes) decreasing, Mankiw is defi-
nitely wrong. While it is true that T −G becomes negative when government
deficit-spends, government needs money to carry out deficit spending. Let
us for now say that the pool of money available, Mpo is fixed. Then gov-
ernment will borrow from private agents. Because government took away
money of private agents with a promise to pay them back, available pool of
money does decrease. However, after government does spend the money it
borrowed, the pool of money Mpo becomes intact.
Therefore, in order for the Mankiw’s conclusion in Principles of Macroe-
conomics to hold, 1. the shape of investment and saving curve in loanable
funds model would be something unconventional or/and 2. Mankiw is ar-
guing that because fiscal spending takes time to be carried out, national
savings remain decreased, driving r high for some times or/and 3. liquid-
ity preference takes more roles, more specifically cash-hoarding or/and 4.
some of savings induced by government spending become not available for
loanable funds due to financial(including things involving different interest
rates, et cetera) and investment plan issues that would necessitate a need
to make IS-LM more complex.
While Point 1 and Point 2 in the preceding paragraph will be clear to most
readers, Point 3 may not be clear, so I explain. Let us assume that govern-
ment spends G by borrowing from private agents entirely. Let us say one
individual/firm a1 receives all G. While this is not a realistic simplification,
the approach can surely be generalized. Then a1 will consume parts of G,
invest parts of G and save parts of G. Then G = c1 + i1 + s1. We notice that
from the saving of G, now saving is s1. But is wrong to conclude that saving
G has become s1. For c1 and i1 will also be given to others - and in the end,
saving G will be retained. However, if a1 has strong preference toward hold-
ing cash (liquid asset, paying zero interest) instead of interest-paying asset
that is considered almost riskless, though is not completely riskless (but it
is also wrong to say cash is a completely riskless asset all the time), then it
may not be true that all of G may become available as loanable funds. In
such case, amount of national savings remain repressed, and r remains high,
until it returns to the natural baseline rate of interest r∗.
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Point 3 merits its own important note - that in certain situations, loanable
funds model does require specification of liquidity preference, specifically
cash-hoarding nature. If one lives in a world where cash-hoarding is irrel-
evant, then unless more complicated financial structures are elaborated in
IS-LM, Point 3 is almost not possible. In a certain sense, Point 3 is a re-
statement of the Keynes’s argument against pure loanable funds model, but
from a different perspective.
It seems that Mankiw does notice Point 2, as seen in page 297 of Macroeco-
nomics, discussing Obama fiscal stimulus plan, but it is not clear if he has
this in mind in loanable funds context. If he does, it is unfortunate that he
did not state this clearly. But delays of investments carried out by private
sector are in reality, and some may suggest that only considering govern-
ment as a delay source is a bit unfair.
Regardless, let us consider the case where because people demand liquid
cash, the full saving G does not come back completely - that is, let us ne-
glect Point 1 and 2 and just assume Point 3. Then, considering investment
curve as referring to private investment solely, saving curve is still left to
the saving curve before borrowings for deficit-spending occurred. Assuming
no central bank operation, r will remain higher and quantity of loanable
funds will remain lower.
Again, if there is no such thing as cash-hoarding liquidity preference, then
saving curve returns to normal level and original equilibrium interest rate
and quantity of loanable funds returns.
But from the above, we just noted the complaints made by Keynes that this
type of saving curve ignores the relationship between savings and income. I
will address this part in the following section.
4. loanable funds, IS-LM and fiscal deficits II
For this section and afterwards, let us assume that there is no cash-hoarding
preference in an economy. This means that saving curve just returns to the
previous level before deficit spending, with investment curve remaining the
same, assuming Y has not changed. This implies that when LM curve is
not flat, even in short-run government deficit spending does not increase r,
therefore inconsistent with the movement of IS curve. When LM curve is flat
in equilibrium, then loanable funds and IS-LM can coexist together. These
all assuming that Y remains constant.
But the assumption related to Y is exactly what we need to question. What
happens to Y in a loanable funds-included model?
One may say due to marginal propensity to consume (MPC), Y needs to
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increase in a multiplier fashion by government deficit spending, as in Old
Keynesian logic - New Keynesians think differently, but as we stick with
discussion of static models, in which IS-LM is part of, we will mostly discuss
Old Keynesian logics, while static New Keynesian models certainly exist, as
a sideline model. After all, this paper is not about questionable assumptions,
but how consisting theories fit well together.
However, this is a wrong characterization of how equilibrium model works.
Let us think of an economy with homogeneous agents - so everyone has
same MPC. Realistically, these agents do not operate at a single time as in
a static simultaneous equilibrium model. In an equilibrium model and real-
ity, these agents consume, invest and save. Let us focus on saving. Saving
generates investment, according to neoclassical theory, as can be inferred
from the models, in loanable funds fashion. Then this investment becomes
someone else’s income, and so on. What a simultaneous equilibrium model
like a loanable funds-included model then does is incorporating all these
events that have occurred in several time periods into a single time period
that can be solved in equilibrium manners.
This implies that there is no reason to think of government interventions
as something that stands out of private decisions, if they are considered
occurring in the same time period as private decisions are in. Therefore, if
everyone is homogeneous, output Y is not affected by deficit spending.
Relaxing our assumption that all agents be homogeneous, deficit spending
can affect Y positively in short-run. If government borrows from the people
that have less MPC and spends money toward people that have more MPC,
then it may be possible that Y is affected positively. (You can replace MPC
with productivity also)
But this argument is not directly related to IS-LM or loanable funds model.
Indeed what is really required is non-homogeneity of economic agents, not
these models. IS-LM together with loanable funds model remain inapplica-
ble.
The other possibility is that the roles of inventories may be greater than
what IS-LM and loanable funds model express. Indeed, in NIPA accounting,
investment is defined as containing inventories. However, this again has not
much to do IS-LM, but may have more use in Keynesian cross. This does
not change the fact that IS-LM will still not be consistent with loanable
funds model.
In this stage, I am somehow afraid that I may have said things that some
people already have known - though some people miss these apparently. But
this seems to be important and often missed - while there are some very
questionable and likely wrong arguments made by some New Classical writ-
ers, I believe that the things I mentioned above are also in some people’s
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minds, although they have not expressed those in a way I did here.[4][5]
In a certain sense, this is the savings version of Sumner critique[6] - all gov-
ernment does in homogeneous economy is just replacing someone’s role of
transferring money to others. (In Sumner critique, if government increases
aggregate demand (AD), thereby violating central bank’s target of AD, then
central bank just pushes back AD so that the target can be met in AS-AD
model.)
5. Saving curve moving left, or investment curve moving right? I
In the previous section, investment side in loanable funds is defined as re-
ferring to private investment. What if investment side is defined as referring
to total investment, both private and government? If one follows the stan-
dard description of only investment curve moving to right after government
deficit spending, would not loanable funds/IS-LM result in more output and
higher r? After all, this approach does not seem to suffer from the flaws we
saw in the Mankiw’s textbook, as we no longer have to move savings curve.
For simplification, let us think of an economy where all agents are homoge-
neous. Note that it is absurd to think of investment curve as being invariant
to Y . If I is invariant to Y , then as Y increases, saving S would shift right
until one reaches lower bound real interest rate. This cannot be true, unless
someone has a different vision of an economy. But this means that what
Keynes said as lacking in pure loanable funds model applies applies to in-
vestment side. If we do not know what final output Y will be, we cannot
talk about what definitive investment curve will be. As said in the previous
section, it is wrong to think that government investment obviously boost
output - one should not just think that final investment equilibrium curve
will be before-deficit-curve plus government deficit spending, because we are
talking about simultaneous equilibrium models here.
6. Another trouble for the combination of loanable funds and
IS-LM
This section is in relation to Point 3 and the previous section. Let us think
about an economy with non-homogeneous agents so that Y can be increased
by deficit spending. What happens in loanable funds model? If we assume
that quantity that is desired to save is proportional to Y , then saving curve
shifts to right. It is unclear how investment curve will behave - but let us
assume that it does shift right. If investment curve’s shift is less than saving
curve’s shift, then we generate IS curve as said above, and loanable funds
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indicate lower r with higher quantity of loanable funds than before deficit
spending. As we saw in other sections, it is wrong to think of fiscal deficit
as movement of IS curve to right, so the one just elaborated is the right
approach. But in equilibrium, we had a certain loanable funds amount.
Where do extra loanable funds come from? In the above, it can be seen
clearly that government deficit spending does not generate extra total sav-
ings. Then it must come from private agents. But people cannot save more
than what they can save. They can individually change MPC, but that does
not change total savings. Unless other financial structures are provided, or
cash-hoarding preference is introduced, there is no way that total loanable
funds may change. Therefore, it seems that for IS-LM cash-hoarding is cru-
cial than most people expect. Without cash-hoarding preference, IS-LM does
not work, and extra loanable funds due to output increase from government
deficit spending are only available because extra cash was left that react to
income change. However, even in such case, different reaction functions to
output increase, whether for homogeneous agents reacting the same way or
for heterogeneous agents, may yield results that are inconsistent with our
predictions.
It is also true, of course, that since our IS curve (without cash-hoarding) did
not shift, in order for higher output to occur, LM curve needs to move. But
since IS-LM is, for most parts, fixed-price analysis, it is beneficial for us not
to go too deep with IS-LM for now.
There are, though, three ways to think of a way out without emphasizing
cash-hoarding. First is considering saving curve in loanable funds model as
indicating mainly cash-hoarding liquidity preference. That is, in lower r,
people consider cash and interest-bearing savings as almost equivalent, so
agents do not provide much supply of loanable funds, but in higher r, people
come to appreciate interest-bearing savings, so supply gets more provided.
Second approach is, basically doing what original neoclassicals did. That is,
assume vertical supply curve. Depending on how vertical supply curve is es-
tablished vertical supply curve may solve the issue underlined above. Third
approach is accepting that Y does not increase after deficit spending.
7. Saving curve moving left, or investment curve moving right?
II
Now with reference to the previous section, we will discuss some of trou-
bling aspects of investment-curve-shifting-right-in-loanable-funds approach
to government deficit spending. Let us abbreviate this approach as ICSR ap-
proach. As done with some other sections, an economy is assumed to have
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no cash-hoarding behaviour.
ICSR approach says that whenever government deficit spending increases,
quantity of loanable funds increases. But as we have seen in the previous
section, without extra cash-hoarding - or other relevant reasons for which IS-
LM cannot be used as a model of economies - there can be no way that extra
loanable funds for the increase of quantity of funds exist. While Mankiw’s
non-ICSR approach allowed at least saving loanable funds and IS-LM ap-
proach by taking the Third approach - that government deficit does not
increase output, ICSR approach does not allow such rescue.
We may also think in terms of having two markets: one for private loanable
funds market and one for government bonds market (though I will not go
over details - I will deal only with very simplified concepts for now). When
government increases deficits, Each market, in equilibrium, concurrently es-
tablishes a new interest rate for the event of government borrowing. How
equilibrium is established is that because government deficits dry up, na-
tional savings decrease for temporary time and interest rate does increase.
However, after government spends that money - national savings in loanable
funds market come back, generating a new equilibrium r.
This shows that either ICSR approach is misleading, or ICSR approach con-
flicts with the account of several time periods. That is, ICSR approach may
be generating a wrong conclusion because several time periods have been
gathered in a wrong way. Either way, ICSR approach is difficult to defend
or is misleading, assuming non-ICSR and ICSR approaches, in the end, are
the same thing as Mankiw asserts.
8. Keynesian Cross approach
As said in first few sections, Keynesian Cross model is often used to derive
IS curve. While I have focused on loanable funds interpretation of IS-LM,
there may be possibility that Keynesian cross may save ordinary IS-LM fis-
cal deficit analysis. The verdict that will be reached at the end of this section
is that Keynesian cross model is incompatible with how IS curve is designed
to be.
There are different interpretations of Keynesian Cross model, but in general
they share same qualitative ideas. Following Mankiw’s interpretation (page
289 of Mankiw’s Macroeconomics), as we have done so far, Keynesian cross
model represents intersection of planned expenditure (PE) curve with the
actual output/income (Y ) line which is the 45-degree line. Let PE be in
y-axis, and Y be in x-axis. PE = C + I + G where C = C(Y − T ), meaning
that C is function of Y − T , I = I(Y − T, r). While in loanable funds model,
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I often includes G as well, from now one, I will strictly represent private
investment, not government spending. In equilibrium, PE = Y . Because I
is the function of r, if r decreases, then PE curve shifts up (y-axis) by ∆I1,
and if r increases, then PE shifts down by ∆I2. Mapping the equilibrium
points Y = PE that correspond to each r ceteris paribus is what IS curve
does.
In ordinary Keynesian-Cross-IS-LM analysis, when government increases
deficit spending, PE shifts up by ∆G, amount of government spending
increase. Then Y and PE both increase by ∆G/(1 −MPC) by equi-
librium/multiplier effects. This shifts IS curve to the right (x-axis) by
∆G/(1 −MPC) (where y-axis is r, x-axis is Y ). But LM-side is not
modelled, which means that in final equilibrium, Y may not increase by
∆G/(1 −MPC). Interaction with LM changes r, which shifts PE curve in
Keynesian Cross.
What should be noticed is that IS curve is the set of equilibrium points, and
therefore Y = C + I + G = PE necessarily for IS curve. And assuming that
IS curve itself does not change then any new intersection of IS-LM curve
caused by shifts and movements of LM curve should be attainable. If IS
curve changes, then every point in the new IS curve should be attainable
with corresponding movements of LM curve.
This suggests us to look at the case where, after G increases shifting IS curve
to the right, Y1 did not increase because LM curve moved in a corresponding
way. This does not mean that G increase caused LM curve to move - rather,
we can imagine a central bank changing money supply independently of G
increase. But in such case, r increases unless in Hicksian liquidity trap. Due
to increase in r, investment necessarily changes, because I = I(r) and Y did
not change. If complete crowding-out did not occur so that ∆I < ∆G, then
by Y = C + I + G, C necessarily needs to decrease.
Therefore, C’s independent variable cannot purely be Y , and in order to
ensure consistency of IS-LM, C = C(r, Y ). If one works with purely Keyne-
sian Cross model, though, C = C(r, Y ) is not needed. C can still be function
purely of Y .
This is important, because derivation of IS curve from Keynesian Cross is
done by assuming that C = C(Y ), not C = C(r, Y ). To restate things, as-
suming that C function is linear, C = a + bY is assumed in Keynesian Cross,
rather than C = a + bY + cr. This means that the whole derivation of IS
curve is done wrongly, because now one cannot sustain C = C(Y ) assump-
tion. To correct the problem, one needs to model consumption behaviour to
r, possibly under intertemporal setting which is outside of Keynesian cross
and for intertemporal setting, IS-LM analysis.
Otherwise, it must be the case that increase in G crowds-out completely
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private investment, that is ∆G = −∆I.
While the above consistency check is enough for our purpose, one may
go further and think of the reason why Keynesian-Cross-IS-LM analysis
in the end does involve loanable funds, except in a special case. In na-
tional income accounting and in equilibrium, C + I + G = C + S + T . Ig-
noring taxes for now - that is government does not tax its citizens, we get
Y = C + I + G = C + S. That is, I + G = S, which goes back to loanable
funds model if S = S(Y, r). Only when S = S(I) where S(I) : S = I + G
with I as an independent variable for S would loanable funds model be
avoided. If S = S(I), then S does not need to be modelled at all, as I auto-
matically determines S.
If one does not adopt S = S(I), then what we get from loanable funds un-
derstanding of IS-LM must match with Keynesian Cross understanding of
IS-LM. For that reason, I have not and will not discuss Keynesian Cross un-
derstanding of IS-LM any further - for S = S(I) would anyway be outside
the scope of this paper and for other cases loanable funds understanding is
enough for our analysis.
9. More intuitive discussion of ICSR approach
Let us now think about how non-ICSR and ICSR reality may, if that is, be
different. That is, while we assumed that “the reality” in the analysis above
is the same one, here we consider cases where each approach corresponds
to a different reality. I hope analysis above gets another dimension with
this intuitive discussion. Cash-hoarding is excluded by assumption. In non-
ICSR world, government borrows from initial government bonds market and
private investment gets funded in a separate market. In ICSR world, both
government spending and private investment get funded in the same market.
Referring from analysis above, when government deficit spending increases
by the same amount for both markets, non-ICSR world may experience a
very short-term increase in r, but r returns back to original level unless Y
increases (or even decreases). As one will see, we do not have to make a call
on what Y might be for now. In ICSR world, by ordinary IS-LM analysis,
r increases with increase in Y . Ignoring institutional detail, everything is
same for two realities - G increases by the same amount, agents are the
same people and so on - except that r is different.
But note that it is actually ICSR world that has higher r. This strongly
suggests that ICSR world having higher Y than non-ICSR world in the
short-run end would really be weird. Higher r usually is associated with
lower consumption and lower private investment, but non-ICSR world has
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lower output.
If the short-run end result is that non-ICSR world has greater Y compared
to ICSR world, then it will be sensible for agents to switch to non-ICSR
world from ICSR world. And we are already in non-ICSR world, making
ICSR analysis irrelevant for fiscal analysis. After all, fiscal authority would
want to have higher Y as possible.
10. Extraneous mentions: AD-AS model
While this paper focuses entirely on IS-LM and loanable funds, it may be
worthwhile to mention AD-AS model, because AD-AS, for most of time, is
built upon IS-LM. If what is said above is accurate analysis, then it is clear
that AD-AS which relies on IS-LM cannot be used.
There were certainly critics of AD-AS model who nevertheless thought IS-
LM may have some use. We consider Barro (1994)[6] as an example here. At
the time of Barro’s writing, AS curve was mainly in classical nature, as can
be referred from Barro’s writings. As what Barro said in Barro (1994), if AS
curve is derived in mostly classical ways, then AS curve’s flexbible nature is
inconsistent with sticky-price nature of AD side.
But nowadays, there many types of AS curves being taught nowadays with
sticky price, wage or imperfect information. Out of them, the most popu-
lar one is sticky price one, represented by P = E[P ] + [(1 − s)a/s](Y − Yn),
or by an equivalent but more recognizable form P = sE[P ] + (1 − s)[P +
a(Y − Yn)], as seen in page 382 of Mankiw’s Macroeconomics textbook.
Therefore, Barro’s argument does not seem to be relevant today.
Sticky-price AS curve is not without criticism, and one of these criticisms[7]
will be referred to as an example. In the sticky-price equation above, given
that E[P ] remains constant, how AS is derived flows from Y˜ = Y − Yn, out-
put gap from natural output level, to P (causality). That is, if demand
becomes stronger due to increased output gap, firms who set price flexibly
will raise price, resulting in higher price level. However, AD curve’s causal
nature is from P to Y . Therefore, while the resulting AD-AS model is sound
algebraically, a such model fails to explain how economy reaches an equilib-
rium position from a disequilibrium position. When excess supply exists in
an economy, creating a disequilibrium, AD curve tells that price needs to be
lowered to generate more demands, boosting output. However, in AS-side
if output increases, then given constant expectation, price level increases.
Therefore, if an economy ever comes out of an equilibrium, AD-AS becomes
unreliable. And it is absurd to say that increasing price level increases out-
put in this AD-AS model.
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For comparison, let us think of ordinary demand-supply model of goods
market. In this model, both demand and supply functions are the functions
of price P . Assume that the market is in excess supply. Then price needs
to be lowered to generate more demand. Similarly, lowering of price results
in removal of excess supply - and each side gains from such movement due
to underlying utility or profit maximization. This is the force that allows
equilibrium to be stable, but for sticky-price AD-AS model, a similar stable
force cannot be found.
11. Conclusion
This paper discussed several issues in connecting loanable funds and IS-
LM, and how these affect the discussions surrounding fiscal deficit stimulus.
While the issues discussed above are mostly related to the models that are
only often used in undergraduate economics, nevertheless these issues remain
relevant today, as many economists continue to reference these models as
useful tools to illustrate their points. I hope more discussions will follow
after this short paper.
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